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However, its application causes many difficulties. This article briefly
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and explores its application in the Netherlands since the late 1990s,
including a case study of the Safety Programme. The focus is on
transparency and the quality of the performance information.
Compared to the former input budget, performance-based budgeting
constitutes a major step forward. Given the many difficulties in
implementing performance budgeting, it is recommendable, though,
to critically revise its scope and shape.
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PERFORMANCE BUDGETING IN THE NETHERLANDS: BEYOND ARITHMETIC1. Introduction
Public performance seems to be key to (re)gain people’s trust in politics and
in government in general these days. For almost two decades, major efforts
have been made to improve the problem-solving capacity and the quality of
government services and their administrations. Within public finance, one of
the most important reforms during this period of “reinventing government” is
the transformation from input to output budgeting. Following other OECD
countries, the Dutch government launched a performance-oriented budget
reform: Van Beleidsbegroting tot Beleidsverantwoording (VBTB). Linking policy,
budget and performance should enable politicians to make better ex ante
decisions on the allocation of the budget and to improve ex post accountability.
Though on paper the reforms sound promising, in practice reformers face
many difficulties. Recurring problems are, among others, the formulation of
(sound) objectives, getting useful performance data and linking government
performance (the output) to societal impact (the outcome). The efforts to
establish a performance budget in the Netherlands are no exception. According
to a government-wide self-evaluation (TwK 29 949, No. 1)1 five years after its
introduction, some major improvements have been made, in particular in terms
of transparency. To implement the directives on results seems to be
troublesome. For the Dutch government, these difficulties were the reason for
introducing the principle of “useful and relevant” embodied in a “comply or
explain” clause: a department should inform Parliament about those budget
items for which it does not make sense, or it is not relevant, to formulate
performance indicators.
The annual review of the Dutch Court of Audit shows a comparable picture
concerning the result orientation of the VBTB budgets. As these reviews focus
predominantly on the availability of the information, they do not give insight on
the quality of the information. In this article, we will take a look behind the
figures to make a more comprehensive assessment of VBTB. We will follow two
tracks. First, we will give an overall view of VBTB in practice, as it is portrayed by
the government-wide evaluation and the reports of the Court of Audit. Second,
we will step outside the domain of budgets into the field of monitoring reports of
policy programmes. Within the policy domain, focusing on results seems to be
less problematic, as evident in the great number of extensive monitoring reports
and impact studies. Given the difficulties with performance budgets, questions
arise as to why, for policy programmes, a results orientation is less problematicOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 20062
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explore the information value of the monitoring reports of one of the main policy
programmes of the Balkenende Cabinet(s), “Towards a safer society” (2002). What
is the quality of the performance data and how does this information rank in
terms of VBTB conformity? Before we start with our analysis, we will give a short
history of performance budgeting reforms and the role of the OECD as a
community for transferring (best) practices on budgetary reform.
The article is structured as follows. We start with a short overview of the
current performance movement, arguing that the OECD has served as a platform
for the distribution of the performance budgeting model as applied by the Anglo-
Saxon countries (Section 2). In the late 1990s, the Dutch government launched a
major reform of both the budget format and budget process. Referred to by its
Dutch acronym, VBTB is geared to transparency in order to improve both ex ante
and ex post control by Parliament. In addition, it is argued that it promotes
efficiency, linking inputs to outputs (Section 3). The performance of VBTB is
assessed using data that are collected and provided by the Court of Audit every
year. At face value VBTB seems to be successful, though no assessment is made
of the quality and, therefore, the reliability and validity of the performance
information (Section 4). In addition, one may question the link between the
components of the model and, therefore, the impact on efficiency as is illustrated
by the Safety Programme that has been launched by the Dutch government to
deal with threats (Section 5). We conclude that VBTB may not have met
expectations and that there is still room for improvement, but that VBTB
constitutes a major step forward in comparison to the old-fashioned input
budget.
2. The international performance movement
The first efforts to establish a performance-based budget at a national level
date from the interbellum. A couple of years after World War II, the Hoover
Committee in the United States recommended that “… the whole budget
should be refashioned by the adoption of a budget based upon functions,
activities and projects: this we designate a ‘performance budget’” (Hoover, 1950,
p. 8; Schild, 1985, p. 21). The advice of the Hoover Committee was followed in
the early 1960s, when Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy
administration, asked the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica to design a system
that would facilitate communication between planners and “budgeteers”.
The experiment with the so-called Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS) worked well at the Department of Defense and so it was declared
applicable to all federal departments and agencies. In his speech, President
Johnson argued that the use of the most modern methods of programme analysis
would ensure a much sounder judgment through more accurate information,OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2006 3
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that ought to be done less (Williams, 1998, p. 61; Radin, 2000, p. 17). Unfortunately,
it did not bring what was expected in other policy areas due to a variety of
reasons, and not long afterwards PPBS was abandoned (Wildavsky, 1974, p. 206).
In retrospect, one may conclude that the relation between the components
of the system was cut, but that the elements of the system survived. One of these
elements was a programme structure of the budget that would not reflect an
agency’s organisational structure in order to promote greater co-ordination and to
avoid service gaps or overlap (Downs and Larkey, 1986, p. 157). A programme-
based budget should be carefully distinguished from a performance budget2 but
they have in common that policy or substance matters. In addition, both are
geared to an improvement of effectiveness and efficiency in the public sector.
For roughly two decades, the idea of a performance-based budget has
regained attention, as both economic pressure and mounting demands from
citizens called for better public sector performance (OECD, 2005b). Initiated by the
Anglo-Saxon countries, notably New Zealand and to a lesser degree Australia,
Canada and the United States (OECD, 1997; OECD, 2005a), nowadays the
performance movement is widespread. The idea is propagated, inter alia, through
the exchange of (best) practices in international forums, such as the meeting of
senior budget officials at the OECD and expert meetings (Kristensen et al., 2002,
p. 31). The senior budget officials of OECD countries established a network on
performance and results that serves as an epistemic community, “… a network of
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain
and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or
issue area” (Haas, 1992, p. 3).
One of the benefits of an epistemic community is that it can shed light on
the inter-relation of issues and on the chain of events that follow from a specific
policy or that might happen if no action is taken (Haas, 1992, p. 15). Though one
may question the democratic legitimacy of an epistemic community, it is a
widespread practice to rely on the judgment of independent expert bodies
(Scharpf, 1999, p. 16), notably if:
● The mechanisms of electoral accountability are thought to be unsuited, and
maybe counterproductive, for assuring policy choices that are oriented
towards the public interest.
● The policy choices are characterised by a high level of technical complexity,
whereas there is broad agreement on the criteria for distinguishing desirable
from undesirable outcomes.
● The electorally accountable office holder may over-ride, if necessary, the
judgment of independent expert bodies.
A survey on budget practices and procedures conducted by the OECD and
the World Bank in 2003 reveals that only 7 out of 38 countries (18.4%) haveOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 20064
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budget (OECD and World Bank, 2003). In addition, performance information is
provided in 19 out of 38 countries (49.6%), ranging from less than 25% to more
than 75% of the budget. It is only fair to note that the cut-off line between
performance budgeting and providing performance information is somewhat
arbitrary. Applied to the Dutch case, one may argue that VBTB constitutes a
performance budget even though reporting covers 75%. In addition, a better
description might be “performance-informed budgeting”, as the goal is to
bring performance information to the table when political decisions are made
(Hilton and Joyce, 2003, p. 403; Schick, 2003).
A closer inspection of the composition of the performance information in
the budget shows that most performance targets are a combination of outcomes
and outputs. In only 3 out 37 countries (7.5%) information is give on both for all
programmes. In addition, 9 out of 37 countries (22.5%) do so for most programmes
and 7 out of 37 (17.5%) for some programmes. The rest provide only information,
if any, about outcomes or outputs (OECD and World Bank, 2003).
3. Performance budgeting in the Netherlands: the VBTB
3.1. Historical background
The start of VBTB induced a sense of déjà vu. The first efforts to replace
the input budget by an output budget date from the mid 1970s when a new
provision was inserted in the Financial Law (Comptabiliteitswet), requiring the
Dutch ministries to provide performance information “if that makes sense
and is considered to be useful”. Not surprisingly, civil servants misused that
phrase. Besides, performance was put into an annex to the budget. Contrary to
the current efforts to generate performance information, the composition of
the budget was not changed (Boorsma et al., 1999, p. 26). The budget format
was basically kept the same, i.e. an input budget (see Box 1).
In the late 1990s the Dutch Minister of Finance, Gerrit Zalm, considered
the time ripe for re-designing the budget documents:
The time is ripe for re-designing the budget documents. This design must be
modernised to enable users to better exercise their duties. The budgets and
accounts must be more accessible, more manageable and readable. The
main policy points are currently difficult to recognise and there is often no
direct relation between the financial proposals and the underlying policy
plans. In addition to insight, the promptness with which the various
documents are made available can also be improved (TwK 26 573, No. 2, p. 4).
The replacement of budget items by policy articles has changed the
composition and classification of the budget. The new budget of each department
reads now as shown in Box 2, making intersectoral comparisons possible.OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2006 5
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towards clarity, considered to be one of the underlying problems of performance-
based budgeting (Hilton and Joyce, 2003, p. 403). Transparency is a key element of
good governance. Applied to budgets it is defined as the full disclosure of all
relevant information in a timely and systematic manner. As such, budgets should
be comprehensive, i.e. encompassing all government revenues and expenditures.
However, the enhancement of transparency is not a purpose of its own, but rather
a means for assessing the necessary trade-offs between different policy options
(OECD, 2001). In addition, transparency may support accountability, credibility,
discipline, equity and stability (OECD, 1999). Last, but not least, performance
Box 1. The composition of the budget
V). Foreign Affairs
VI). Justice
VII). Interior and Kingdom Relations
VIII). Education, Culture and Science
IX). Finance
X). Defence
XI). Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment
XII). Transport, Public Works and Water Management
XIII). Economic Affairs
XIV). Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality
XV). Social Affairs and Employment
XVI). Health, Welfare and Sports
Box 2. The new budget format
● Legislative proposal
❖ Budget statement
● Readers guide
● Policy paragraph
❖ Policy agenda
❖ Policy articles
● Management paragraph
● Agency paragraph
● In-depth appendixOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 20066
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promoting effectiveness and efficiency was not an explicit objective of VBTB, it
definitely was one of the major motivations. After successes in the fields of the
legitimacy and management of government spending, “[t]he use of efficiency
and efficacy as guiding design and classification principles in the budget and
accountability process is […] a logical next step”, as the VBTB policy paper states
(TwK 26 573, No. 1-2, p. 8). In this article we mainly focus on the information that
is needed to draw conclusions about effectiveness and efficiency. The relation
between inputs and outputs or outcomes is illustrated in Figure 1.
3.2. Design
The establishment of VBTB embodies, as such, a new attempt towards
output budgeting in the Netherlands. The question may be raised as to why
the introduction of a performance-based budget would succeed this time. A
major difference from previous efforts is that the ambitions are stronger.
Whereas during the COBA period (Commissie voor de Ontwikkeling van
Beleidsanalyse, Committee for the Development of Policy Analysis, in the 1970s
and early 1980s), the performance information was seen as additional (“nice
to know”) information, the budgetary rules of VBTB prescribe a more profound
integration of financial and policy information (“need to know”). As can be
partly deduced from the project’s name, three elements are key for VBTB:
● A closer link between budget and policy.
Figure 1. A basic input/output model
Sources: MvF, 2002, p. 18; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p. 106 (adapted).
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● A better insight into the relation between objectives, resources and
performance.
The new budget has been centered on three ex ante questions and three
ex post questions (three “W questions” for the budget and three “H questions”
for accountability), as shown in Table 1.3
For the first “W question” a distinction is made between a generic objective
and specific goals. The generic objective describes the intended impact on or
consequences for the community and “ideally concerns the effects aimed at in
society, also known as the final policy effects” or outcomes. Specific goals are
“… intermediary effects (manageable and quantifiable effects that contribute to
realising the so-called final policy effects […] or more tangible effects that give a
fair indication of the final policy effects” (TwK 26 573, No. 1-2, p. 13).4 To be able to
assess the policy effects, ministries must provide performance information that
should, preferably, be at the same level (outcome/output) as the generic objective
and specific goals. If “it is entirely impossible to quantify and measure the effects
aimed at […] efforts will have to fall back on quantifying and measuring wherever
possible the products to be supplied or the activities to be performed”
(TwK 26 573, No. 1-2, p. 13). In 2005, the guidelines were refined by the
introduction of a “comply or explain” clause. A department should inform
Parliament about those budget items for which it does not make sense, or it is not
relevant in its opinion, to formulate performance indicators.
3.3. Assessment of VBTB conformity
The empirical data are taken from the Court of Audit that scrutinises the
budget every year for its conformity with VBTB. The findings are presented to
Parliament on the third Wednesday of May, popularly known as “Wednesday,
chopped meat day” (Woensdag, gehaktdag). It should be underscored that the
Court of Audit does not check the quality of the information. The focus is
upon the availability of the information.
A couple of disclaimers should be made from the start, as the method used
by the Court of Audit to assess the quality of the objectives and performance is
not geared towards conformity with VBTB. The objectives, for instance, are
Table 1. The VBTB questionnaire
Ex ante Ex post
1. What do we want to achieve? 1. Have we achieved what we intended?
2. What steps will we take to achieve it? 2. Have we done what we should have done to achieve it?
3. What should it cost? 3. Did that cost what we had expected?OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 20068
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containing a target value that is measurable through a performance indicator
and that is limited in time (AR, 2005a). If one of these criteria is not met, then
the overall score is negative, even though the score might be positive on the
other two requirements. A similar method applies for performance, the only
exception being the assessment of the resources for which only one out of three
questions should be answered positively. In addition, it should be underscored
(again) that only the availability of performance information is checked, not the
quality of the information. Consequently, the results might not give an accurate
account of the actual information value of the budget.
Apart from methodological criticism, another comment concerns the
interpretation of the budgetary rules. On the one hand, the criteria require that a
policy article contains performance indicators that give information about the
social effects. On the other hand, VBTB initially prescribed that output or
outcome information is preferable, later reaffirmed with the introduction of
“useful or relevant” as guiding principles concerning performance measurement.
Related to this is the statement that the budget is not the sole site for
performance information (MvF, 2005).5 As stated in the budgetary rules, the
primary sources for data about effectiveness and efficiency are policy papers or
periodical monitoring reports. Besides, only performance information that
increases insight on the accompanying budgetary consequences is provided.
To sum up, roughly, it is fair to say that the Court of Audit’s method gives
a too negative view of VBTB conformity of the budget. On the other hand,
given the fact that the method does not include the quality of the information,
we have to be careful when interpreting these data. Without analysing the
actual information, we might draw wrong conclusions.
4. The performance of VBTB
4.1. Transparency
For a couple of years now, the budgets and accounts are published entirely in
the new format. After a test period, in which the ministries could prepare for the
new budgetary rules, the first complete VBTB budgets were presented in
September 2001 (fiscal year 2002). According to the founding fathers of the VBTB,
making the budget more policy oriented means that “… policy spearheads must
indicate the main policy lines (points) at a single glance” (TwK 26 573, No. 1-2,
p. 5). As far as the policy agenda is concerned, the budgets are indeed quite firm.
In about 15 pages a minister describes his/her policy priorities and the financial
consequences of the (new) policies. Compared to the former budget, in which a
minister gave information in roughly 60 pages about the state of affairs for each
policy field separately, this is quite an improvement. In addition, the policy
agenda is more political as well, because of the stronger links with the coalitionOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2006 9
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(TwK 29 949, No. 1, p. 10). Up to now, the operation has brought some major
improvements vis-à-vis the former input budget.
First, the access to and the insight in the budget have been clearly improved.
The number of articles has been reduced substantially from approximately
800 budget items to 150 policy articles. Flexibility has been greatly increased, as a
minister is now able to shift money from one budget item to another. However,
one may question the impact on the ex ante and ex post control by Parliament, as
there has been an increase in the level of aggregation of the information that
is provided in the budget. There is a trade-off between aggregation and
transparency. Information that was in the budget before is now more or less
“hidden” in the in-depth appendix to the budget or only available upon request.
The power of the purse is at stake here, as the Court of Audit has argued correctly
(TwK 29 949, No. 4).
Second, the documents give better and more systematic insight into policy,
i.e. objectives, performances and resources or, more generally, strengthen the
attention to results and thinking in terms of outputs and outcomes in the
policy cycle. However, a closer inspection of the VBTB elements reveals that
departments have difficulties in the formulation of specific goals and
performance indicators. In many cases they do not completely conform to
VBTB. A breakdown is provided in Figure 2, taking data reported by the Court of
Audit every year.
4.2. Generic objectives and specific goals
The assessment regarding the translation of generic objectives into specific
goals is less positive. A breakdown is provided in Table 2 relating the number of
articles (items) to the number of objectives. On average there are 10 policy articles
per department, each reflecting a generic objective. In sum, there are 127 generic
objectives translated into 458 specific goals, which means that basically
everything is a priority and therefore practically not an objective at all
(TwK 26 573, No. 1-2, p. 16). The average is 3.60 specific goals per generic objective.
Besides, the number of specific goals that meet the requirements of conformity
with VBTB (“tSG” in Table 2) is only 40%. Consequently it will be difficult to link
these specific goals to performance indicators, even though the departments are
doing better, as we will see, regarding the formulation of performance indicators.
In order to link inputs to outcomes, the generic objectives should be
translated into more specific goals. At least three conditions should be met.
First, the desirable outcome should be observable. A statement like the
promotion of welfare of all citizens does not say much because attainment
cannot be observed and, therefore, not measured. Second, a quantification of
the desirable outcome is needed to measure performance. Third, it should beOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200610
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the objective should be limited in time (Van Nispen, 1993, pp. 143-144;
TwK 26 573, No. 1-2). To put it differently, they should be SMART, i.e. specific,
measurable, acceptable, realistic and (limited in) time (Van Dijken, 2003).
In sum, about 35% of the specific goals turn out to be in conformity with
VBTB.6 In addition, for 18% of the specific goals, an explanation is given for
why they do not conform. The remaining 47% of the specific goals are unclear.
A breakdown of the specific goals by department reveals a wide variety in
terms of conformity.
A closer inspection of the specific goals shows that the formulation of
a large number of objectives is partly due to misinterpretation of the new
budgetary rules. For example, on many occasions resources or activities are
presented as specific goals, instead of the intended output or outcome. Another
problem is the delimitation of the objectives. Many objectives are too broad (in
terms of social impact) and too little distinct from other objectives (both those
Figure 2. The VBTB conformity of objectives
Fiscal year 2006, in percentages of the total
Source: AR, 2006a.
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PERFORMANCE BUDGETING IN THE NETHERLANDS: BEYOND ARITHMETICwithin the same budget and those in the budget of other departments). As this
often coincides with a minimum of information on the rationale (purpose and
need) for government intervention, it is difficult to assess the why, what and
how of a policy as described in a certain policy article (MvF, 2006).7
Apart from formulating “proper” objectives, the departments have
difficulties in making the intended results measurable. Each year, the
Netherlands Court of Audit assesses the VBTB conformity of the budget and
accounts. Considering the first “W question” in Table 1 (What do we want to
achieve?), the Court states that more than half of the departments give proper
information about the intended effects for less than 50% of the objectives (the
so-called “W1 score”). The norm used by the Court is that the intended effect
is concrete: when it is made measurable by means of a performance indicator;
when a time frame is set; and when it contains an intended direction (AR,
2005a, p. 13).8
According to the Court of Audit, the differences between the ministries cannot
be explained by differences in the characteristics of the policy fields. In principle,
the policy field of the Ministry of Economic Affairs does not differ from the policy
field of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports. Both departments have to
Table 2. The generic objectives and specific goals per budget item 
(budget for fiscal year 2006)
Chapter Department GO1 SG Ratio SG/GO tSG2 Ratio tSG/SG
III Prime Minister 1 (. .) 4 4.00 0 0
V Foreign Affairs 8 (3) 34 4.25 19 56
VI Justice 7 (3) 18 2.57 6 33
VII Interior and Kingdom Relations 12 (2) 29 2.42 7 24
VIII Education, Culture and Science 16 (4) 54 3.38 10 19
IX Finance 8 (2) 25 3.13 8 32
X Defence 7 (3) 31 4.42 8 26
XI Housing, Spatial Planning 
and the Environment 13 (1) 47 3.62 31 66
XII Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management 8 (3) 56 7.00 27 48
XIII Economic Affairs 8 (3) 27 3.38 22 81
XIV Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 7 (2) 29 4.14 13 45
XV Social Affairs and Employment 15 (3) 38 2.53 22 58
XVI Health, Welfare and Sports 17 (2) 66 3.88 12 18
Total 127 (31) 458 3.60 185 40
1. The number of policy items is used as a proxy for the number of generic objectives. The number of
non-policy items is shown in brackets.
2. The term “tSG” means a specific goal that conforms to VBTB.
Source: Budget Memorandum 2006 (AR, 2006a).OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200612
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2005a, p. 17).9 In an official response, the government pointed out that it disagrees
with the Court’s assumption of “where there is a will, there is a way” (AR, 2005a, p.
45). Ever since a government-wide evaluation of VBTB, the line of reasoning is that
performance measurement is not always “useful and relevant”: “More important
than measurable general objectives is a convincing explanation about the way in
which specific goals and instruments deployed contribute to the general objective”
(TwK 29 949, No. 1, p. 38). Ever since the budgetary rules in 2005 (MvF, 2005), the
criteria “useful and relevant” are formal guidelines concerning performance
measurement. The government thus followed its own point of view, at the expense
of the recommendations of the Court of Audit. However, on the request of
Parliament (motion Douma c.s.), this new adage is restrained by the principle of
“comply or explain”10 (TwK 29 949, No. 11).
4.3. Performance indicators
The question may be raised as to how much of the budget is covered by
performance indicators. In the first half of the 1980s, coverage increased from
29.5% to 41.5% of the budget (Schild, 1985, p. 23). At the end of the century, the
number of output indicators had increased to more than 65% of the budget
(TwK 26 200, pp. 74-75). A closer look at the budget for FY 1999 – the last
submitted by the so-called purple cabinet (Prime Minister Kok, 1992-2000) –
reveals that it referred to that part of the budget “for which it is considered
to be appropriate to formulate performance indicators”. The coverage is
shrinking to approximately 36% if we relate the performance indicators to the
whole budget.11
Contrary to the first “W question”, the ministries do quite well regarding
the second “W question”, i.e. the activities (throughput) and the result of these
activities (output). The number of performance indicators that meet the test
covers 60% of the specific goals. Besides, an explanation is given for 6% of the
specific goals, i.e. the performance indicators for 34% of the specific goals do
not conform to VBTB.12 A breakdown by department shows that the score of
most departments tops the 50% mark. The only exceptions are the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Chapter V) and the Ministry of Defence (Chapter X).
The coverage of performance indicators is overestimated and
underestimated at the same time. They are overestimated because the Court
of Audit, as mentioned before, has only looked at the provision of information
about the target value of the performance indicator for each policy
instrument. Unfortunately, the score does not say much about the quality and,
therefore, reliability and validity of the performance indicators. In fact, the
percentage of performance indicators that make sense is probably
substantially lower than assessed by the Court of Audit in its annual report.
On the other hand, the performance indicators are underestimated because aOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2006 13
PERFORMANCE BUDGETING IN THE NETHERLANDS: BEYOND ARITHMETICpositive score is only given if all criteria are met. In many cases, departments
are doing well on two out of three questions. Unfortunately, the ratio of
specific goals and performance indicators that have both met the test is
unclear because the raw data are not made public.
4.4. Resources
The third “W question” in Table 1 (What should it cost?) is sufficiently
answered when the programme budget is related to a specific goal, reflecting
the main difference with the old-fashioned input budget. However, most
information about resources was already available in the old budget and,
therefore, it is not a surprise that all departments are doing well with an
average score of slightly more than 85%.
In addition, two questions must be answered – the budget and costs
per instrument – but they are not needed for a positive score on the third
“W question”. In the next paragraphs, we will apply the three “W questions” to
the Safety Programme, launched by the Dutch government at the end of 2002.
Figure 3. The VBTB conformity of performance indicators
Fiscal year 2006, in percentages of the total
Source: AR, 2006a.
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PERFORMANCE BUDGETING IN THE NETHERLANDS: BEYOND ARITHMETIC5. The case of the Safety Programme
5.1. “Towards a Safer Society”: a bird’s eye view
For many years, public safety has been an important issue in the
Netherlands. Out of 16 political objectives, most of the time people identify crime
fighting and preserving order as the most important topics (SCP, 2005, p. 253).
After a turbulent start of the 21st century (with, among others, the rise of
international terrorism, a political murder and a general increase in crime), the
first Balkenende Cabinet (set up after the elections of July 2002) decided to
increase the efforts to fight crime. This resulted in a policy programme on safety
entitled “Towards a Safer Society” consisting of about 150 measures to reduce
crime and nuisance in the public sphere. There are two main aspects (generic
objectives): 1) objective safety as it appears from official statistics; and
2) subjective safety or the “safety temperature” based on citizens’ opinions about
crime and nuisance. No further distinction is made in specific goals. To
implement the programme, a (relatively) large amount of additional funds is
reserved, starting from EUR 340 million in fiscal year 2003 up to EUR 1 264 million
Figure 4. The VBTB conformity of resources
Fiscal year 2006, in percentages of the total
Source: AR, 2006a.
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PERFORMANCE BUDGETING IN THE NETHERLANDS: BEYOND ARITHMETICin 2008 and 2009 (TwK 28 684, No. 36, pp. 102-103). These amounts add up to the
regularly available budgets for crime fighting; to give an indication, the budget for
the police is approximately EUR 4 billion and about EUR 2 billion for the
Department of Justice.
The monitoring reports of the Safety Programme contain different types
of performance information. Twice a year Parliament is informed about the
proceedings of the programme at four levels:
● The progress of the individual measures.
● The related output.
● The results (effects) concerning objective safety.
● The safety perception (subjective safety).
Progress of the measures is monitored by means of a status report that
includes a description of the measures, the activities to be executed and
performances to be realised, a time schedule and the state of accomplishment.
In addition, Parliament is separately informed about the realised output for
some activities, such as the police performances as agreed upon in performance
contracts. The outcome is measured by quantification of reported offences
(registered crime and nuisance rates as measured in victim and population
surveys).
5.2. Generic objectives and specific goals of the Safety Programme
Initially the programme stated that, as far as objective safety is concerned,
a reduction of 20 to 25% should be evident starting from 2006. After deliberation
with Parliament, this was made more concrete by changing “be evident starting
from 2006” into actual realisation of the intended outcome in the years 2008-10
(TwK 28 684, No. 8, p. 5). But the realisation of objectives for 50 problem areas is
set for 2006 (TwK 28 684, No. 36, p. 5). For subjective safety, there is no concrete
target but an ambition for “substantial improvement”. Table 3 provides an
overview of the target rates.
A positive aspect is that, contrary to many general objectives in the budgets,
there are outcome indicators for both objective and subjective safety. Though this
is not sufficient for assessing the effectiveness of the programme, at least it gives
insight into the general developments in the policy field. Unfortunately, however,
there are no target values for subjective safety. Thus the reported performance
cannot be compared with the intended performance. A second remark has to do
with the time frame of objective safety. The intended results must be achieved
between 2008 and 2010 and not earlier (as the ministers explicitly state
– TwK 28 684, No. 8, p. 5). This is not only problematic for assessing the
effectiveness of the policy programme; it also hinders parliamentary control. As
the Government Spending Committee rightly states, the ministers involved have
to account for the implementation of the policy as it is agreed upon withOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200616
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 theParliament (CRU, 2005, p. 6). Since for subjective safety there is no target value and
for objective safety this value is beyond the minister’s term in office, notably 2007,
this is problematic. To correct this lack of accountability, the Government
Spending Committee advised working with intermediate objectives (CRU, 2005,
p. 6). In our opinion, introducing specific goals that are more related to the
government performance (as in the budget) may indeed improve insight into the
effectiveness of the programme.
5.3. Performance indicators for the Safety Programme
In general little is known about the effects of Dutch safety policy, since
during the last 25 years hardly any policy measure has been properly evaluated
(SCP, 2005, p. 258). For this reason, it is quite remarkable that no ex ante research
was done before formulating the new safety policy. In addition, there was no
consultation with the executive organisations about the feasibility of the
measures (BMC, 2005, p. 81). It is thus uncertain whether the measures will be
executed as intended and on time. A further complication is that the programme
makes no clear distinction between regular and new policy measures (as part of
the Safety Programme). Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether the
measured output and outcome are the result of existing policy or a direct
consequence of the Safety Programme.
Another problem is that the monitoring reports only give performance
information on an aggregate level, on the level of the measures all together.
This is partly due to the fact that the ministers wanted to reduce the
Table 3. Targets concerning objective and subjective safety
2002 (t = 0) 2003 2004 20051 20061 Target rate
Objective safety civilians (national)
Actual experienced crime:
Number of experienced crimes 
against property
1 477 000 1 342 000 1 340 000 1 623 000 1 518 000 Reduction of 20 to 25
in 2008-10
Number of experienced acts 
of violence
1 081 000 1 093 000 964 000 1 302 000 1 096 000 Reduction of 20 to 25
in 2008-10
Actual experienced nuisance 
and corruption:
Serious nuisance 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 Substantial improvem
(Physical) corruption 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.9 Substantial improvem
Subjective safety civilians (national)
Feelings of unsafeness:
Often unsafe (%) 5.4 5.0 4.4 4.1 3.0 Substantial improvem
Rare/sometimes/now and then (%) 30.8 27.7 26.9 27.0 23.7 Substantial improvem
1. Because of a different measuring method, the data for years 2002-04 cannot be immediately compared with
data for 2005-06 (MvJ/BZK, 2006, p. 3).
Source: MvJ/BZK, 2006, Enclosure II, p. 62.OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2006 17
PERFORMANCE BUDGETING IN THE NETHERLANDS: BEYOND ARITHMETIC(inevitable) administrative burden. Though measuring the results of all the
measures (approximately 150) indeed has more costs than benefits, in our
opinion the ministers were too arbitrary. By clustering similar measures
around a couple of distinctive specific goals (as in the VBTB format), insight
into the effects of (groups of) the measures can be drastically increased.
Though, obviously, this will not reveal causal relations, it has a clear added
value for policy evaluation: “If there is no unambiguous evidence for causality,
the ministers should at least provide the necessary information to Parliament
to judge the plausibility of the effect” (CRU, 2003, p. 4).13
An important source of performance data is the data derived from
monitoring policy on public safety and urban policy. In particular the
performance contracts with the police and the performance agreements with the
31 major cities have resulted in large amounts of performance information. The
choice and quality of the indicators are under discussion, however. According to
the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, indicators that deal with numbers of fines
and numbers of suspects create perverse effects at the cost of (among others) the
quality of police work and flexibility – e.g. to adopt national priorities and regional
responses to changing circumstances (CPB, 2003, pp. 10-11).14 Another remark
has to do with the target values. Concerning the performance contracts with the
police (one of the key players of the Safety Programme), the Central Bureau of
Statistics notes that the “government does not have the data to set the
performance targets at the right level […]” and also notes:
Back-of-the envelop calculations indicate that the targets for the number
fines and charges are little ambitious – certainly given the future increase in
the number of police officers. The goals for customer satisfaction may also
be little ambitious since they are based on the own historical performance
(“perform at least as good as you did in the past”). If the targets are set
too low, the force may stop their efforts as soon as the target is reached
(“satisfying behaviour”) (CPB, 2003, pp. 10-11).
A good illustration of this proposition is the performance concerning the
number of fines and transactions: at the end of 2004 the target rates for 2006
were amply surpassed (the target for 2006 was an increase to 180 000; by
end 2004 the number had already reached 548 000). At face value, the policy is
successful; but in fact (because of the low level of the target rates) little
improvement has been made.
Another bottleneck is the effect of policy changes on measurement and
registration. According to the Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) of the
Netherlands, the positive statistics of the past years are not only the result of
the policy, but they are also a consequence of the introduction of performance
contracts that can be manipulated for bureau-politics (SCP, 2005, p. 258). In
other words, the reliability of these data is thus questionable.OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200618
PERFORMANCE BUDGETING IN THE NETHERLANDS: BEYOND ARITHMETIC5.4. Resources for the Safety Programme
Because of “complex management and distribution of responsibilities,
both nationally and locally”, the “considerable investments and increase of
expenditure” and the long implementation period, Parliament has requested
the government (motion Cornielje) to give the Safety Programme a “large project
status” (TwK 28 684, No. 6, pp. 18 and 55). This means additional requirements
concerning the provision of information about the progress of the project to
improve parliamentary control. In addition, the motion requested a separate
programme budget (in conformity with VBTB principles) to get necessary
information about objectives, resources and performance. The ministers agreed
with the “large project status” under the condition that it be executed in a way
that does not involve much extra paper work (TwK 28 684, No. 6, p. 60). The call
for a programme budget was not answered, because it would “disrupt” the
regular budgetary process too much (TwK 28 684, No. 8, p. 3). As a consequence,
the different organisations involved do not separately report about the
resources of the Safety Programme. Neither are resources and performance of
the programme explicitly linked (TwK 28 684, No. 36, pp. 113-114). The budget of
the Safety Programme is presented in Table 4.
In addition, in the fourth monitor report (October 2004), an overview of
the budget allocation to specific goals of the Ministry of the Interior and the
Ministry of Justice was presented (Table 5). With this non-recurring overview,
the ministers were more clear about the cost of the Safety Programme.
5.5. VBTB conformity of the Safety Programme
In a policy brief about the interpretation of the “large project status”, the
Ministers of the Interior and Justice declared that the Safety Programme will be
embedded in the VBTB systematically. According to the ministers, this requires,
according to the ministers, that information be supplied about what has to be
achieved and when, what has to be done in terms of output and outcome, and
what it will cost (TwK 28 684, No. 8, p. 4). Our analysis of the Safety Programme
shows that it is geared towards VBTB but certainly not in conformity with VBTB.
Table 6 expresses the information value in VBTB concepts.
Table 4. The budget of the Safety Programme, FY 2003-09
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
VI Justice 201 373 527 643 758 773 773
VII Interior and Kingdom Relations 132 206 329 421 442 443 443
Miscellaneous 7 24 43 49 49 49 49
Total 340 603 899 1 113 1 249 1 265 1 265
Source: TwK 28 684, No. 36, pp. 102-106.OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2006 19
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the outcome: there is quite a lot of information, but for different reasons it is
unclear whether the outcome is the result of the Safety Programme. On
output, there is quite a lot of data available as well, but here the main concern
is the quality and relevance of the data. Concerning input, the programme is
clear about the costs and the allocation of its budget to the specific goals of the
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice. Given the fact that the
individual measures of the programme are not linked to these specific goals,
Table 5. Allocation of resources according to specific goals
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Ministry of Justice
12.1.1. Administration of justice 20.9 52.5 42.0 39.9 49.4 49.2 49.2
12.2.1. Legal aid 4.6 9.9 18.4 25.4 33.5 33.5 33.5
13.3.2. Public Prosecutor 10.2 35.0 43.5 49.3 55.2 58.0 58.0
13.4.1/2; 15.3.1/2; 14.2.1. Enforcement 
of punishments 132.4 214.1 321.6 375.1 439.1 441.1 441.1
13.4.3/4 SRN (Netherlands Probation 
and After-Care Foundation) 10.9 25.4 43.4 63.0 78.6 82.4 82.4
14.1.4. Youth care services 20.0 23.1 39.9 69.0 75.0 75.0 75.0
Others 2.0 13.1 18.0 21.1 27.6 33.9 33.9
Total 201.0 373.1 526.8 642.8 758.4 773.1 773.1
Ministry of the Interior
2.2. Police (capacity) 112.0 167.0 237.0 300.0 308.0 308.0 308.0
2.2. Police (quality) 20.0 37.0 63.0 81.0 95.0 95.0 95.0
2.5. Police (education) 3.0 13.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Disaster response and fire fighting 16.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Total 132.0 207.0 329.0 421.0 443.0 443.0 443.0
Source: TwK 28 684, No. 36, pp. 102-106.
Table 6. The VBTB conformity of the Safety Programme
“W Questions” VBTB conformity Insufficient
1. What do we want 
to achieve?
– Objective safety: concrete end 
target (improvement of 20 to 25%)
– Outcome indicators for both 
objective and subjective safety
– No targets for subjective safety
– No specific goals
– Quality of indicators
2. What steps will 
we take to achieve it?
– Extensive report on status 
of measures
– No clear relation between measures and effects
– No distinction between “going concern” 
and new policy measures
– No performance indicators for most measures
– Measures are not linked to specific targets
3. What should it cost? – Clear insight on the total costs 
of the programme
– No insight on the total costs of social safety 
policy
– No insight on the costs of the individual 
measuresOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200620
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given the state of information on the three stages (input, output, outcome), it
is difficult to asses the effectiveness and efficiency of the Safety Programme.
6. Conclusions
In recent years there have been many efforts to improve government
performance. After successful operation in the field of the legitimacy and
management of government spending during the 1980s and early 1990s, the
national budget was dragged into the international slipstream of management
reform in the public sector. The triad of objectives, performance and resources
has become the new gospel for a transparent, policy-oriented and result-
oriented budget and accounts in the Netherlands. VBTB has indeed improved
the transparency of the annual budget: the number of budget items has been
reduced; the budget format has been streamlined, making it easier to make
comparisons; and policy and budget are more closely connected. The record
regarding the information provided in the budget is mixed, however. On the one
hand, the degree of information about the generic objectives and specific goals
that conform to VBTB is low (but growing). The findings suggest that the budget
is basically geared to outputs (or throughputs) rather than to outcomes. In
addition, it seems that most of the departments have difficulties in making
intended results measurable. On the other hand, regarding the degree of
information about instruments and resources, the results are more promising
(average scores of about 60% for the second “W question” and 85% for the
third “W question”). However, care should be taken with these figures, as no
judgment is made about the quality and therefore the reliability and validity of
the performance indicators. In practice, as the case of the Safety Programme
has shown, many indicators are simply not relevant or useful. Therefore,
further research should be done to gain more insight into the “purpose and
practice” of performance measurement. For instance, one may question
whether it makes sense to formulate performance indicators for organisational
units that are mainly supervisory and/or produce policy documents. The
growing number of performance indicators that do not conform to VBTB, for
whatever reason, suggests that only a part of the budget is appropriate for (the
formulation of) performance indicators.
In addition to the quality and relevance of performance information,
another aspect is the connection between the policy stages. In the case of the
Safety Programme, to put it simply, there is too much space between input and
outcome. The government-wide VBTB evaluation also concludes that most
policy articles lack a clear policy theory that explains the connection between
objectives, measures and effects. To put it differently, the supposed (causal orOECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2006 21
PERFORMANCE BUDGETING IN THE NETHERLANDS: BEYOND ARITHMETICplausible) relation between input and outcome is unfounded. This is not
surprising, as:
… [it is] frequently the case that outcomes are only partially determined by
government programmes – that there are other determining variables which
are beyond the control of the managers – and that linking resources to
outcomes is, therefore, to greater or lesser degree unfair (Pollitt, 2001, p. 15).
At the same time it is important, for both ex ante and ex post parliamentary
control, that sufficient attention is paid to specific targets and their relation
with the outcome, since these are more related to the actual performance
(output/throughput) of the department(s) involved.
Apart from the information value, another aspect involves the utilisation
of the information that is provided. After all, the reforms aim at performance-
based budgeting and not just performance-based budgets. The literature
suggests that expectations about the role of performance information in
decision making are too high (Pollitt, 2006). Moreover, using the information
may induce contrary or even perverse effects as departments learn to deal with
performance indicators, for instance by focusing on what can be measured and
leaving out what cannot be measured, and performance indicators may become
obsolete over time.15 The influence of performance information depends a great
deal on the institutional setting, as Schick has argued correctly: “performance
budgeting can thrive only when it is embedded in managerial arrangements
that make results paramount” (Schick, 2003, p. 102). If this condition is not met,
the best we may get is “performance informed budgeting” (Hilton and Joyce,
2003, p. 403; bolding added). However, this still constitutes a major step forward
in comparison with the situation that induced the development in the direction
of performance budgeting. With this, we are back where we started: the
function of performance (-based) budgets. According to the OECD, “[t]he
performance movement is here to stay” (OECD, 2004, p. 1). The performance of
VBTB, up to now, has shown that it is indeed possible to take a step forward
with respect to the former input budget. More transparency may support
parliamentary authorisation and control. Focussing on the information value of
the budget, the current format of the VBTB is however too restrictive. Given the
many difficulties in implementing performance budgeting, it is recommended
to critically revise its scope and shape.
Notes
1. The Dutch Parliament uses a numerical system for official government
documents. They are listed in the bibliography under “TwK”, Tweede Kamer.
2. Performance budgeting is a method for the design of a budget rather than a budget
format (Schild, 1985, pp. 20-21).OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 6 – No. 4 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 200622
PERFORMANCE BUDGETING IN THE NETHERLANDS: BEYOND ARITHMETIC3. The words “objectives”, “instruments” and “funds” could be replaced by “effects”,
“performance” and “resources”.
4. “When the general policy objective offers both quantifiable and concrete points of
contact for direct management and policy instruments (such as preserving the
coastline), a translation into specific goals is naturally unnecessary. The general
policy objectives and the specific goals then coincide” (TwK 26 573, No. 1-2, p. 13).
5. Since the 2006 budget, the Court of Audit gives an indication of the percentage of
specific goals for which a minister has shown why there is no concrete performance
information.
6. The coverage was 41% in FY 2005, but fell in FY 2006. At the same time the number
of specific goals for which an explanation is given grew from 1% to 18%.
7. The budget of the Department of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, for instance,
consists of 12 budget items of which six are geared to a more secure society
without any further specification (TwK 30 300, VII, No. 2).
8. The performance indicator can be both qualitative and quantitative (AR, 2005a,
p. 13).
9. It is striking that this point of view of the Court of Audit is completely different
from an earlier statement of the Court in which it evaluated, as a consequence of
the characteristics of some policy fields for some departments (notably the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, the Interior and Finance), the possibilities to
improve performance information: “For these policy articles it seems that it is not
always possible to formulate measurable performance information that is
relevant enough for the intended final effect of the policy” (AR, 2002, p. 31).
10. This implies that, in principle, policy objectives should be formulated in terms of
intended social effects (outcome) and accompanying performance information.
Deviation from this rule is only allowed if the motivation is to conform to the
“comply or explain” principle (motion Douma c.s., TwK 29 949, No. 11).
11. In the next period, performance information is no longer provided as part of the
budget memorandum.
12. The number of performance indicators that conform to VBTB fell from 72% in the
budget for FY 2005 to 60% in the budget for FY 2006.
13. The Minister of Justice advised against a motion of Parliament (motion
Van Heemst c.s.) that requested more clear and concrete information about the
“deliverables”. “It is not in the interest of public safety to endlessly produce extra
paper”, according to Donner, Minister of Justice (TwK 28 684, No. 6, p. 59).
14. Recently the Dutch Minister of the Interior recognised this problem and proposed
to abolish the performance agreements that involve numbers of fines.
15. The authors argue that performance indicators may be subject to what Meyer and
Gupta have called a performance paradox (Meyer and Gupta, 1994; De Bruijn, 2001;
Van Thiel and Leeuw, 2002; TwK 26 573, No. 70, p. 13).
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